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The Farm Debt Crisis and Public Policy 
U. S. FARMS, and with them agricultural lending institutions, are currently 
experiencing their most severe stress since the 1930s. From 1980 to 1984, 
the average real value of U.S. farmland dropped by 29 percent. The 
decline has been most pronounced in the Corn Belt and Northern Plains 
states that produce cash grains, general livestock, and dairy products; 
in Nebraska, for example, the real value of farmland is half what it was 
in 1980. The erosion in the value of equity has had the effect of increasing 
the leverage of many farm borrowers. Delinquent loans have increased 
substantially, hitting 7.5 percent of total loans at small agricultural banks 
by mid-1985. 
Agricultural bank earnings are down and bank failures are up. In 1983, 
seven insured commercial agricultural banks failed; in 1984 and 1985, 
the figure rose to thirty-two and sixty-eight, respectively. Agricultural 
banks accounted for 41 percent of the insured commercial banks that 
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failed in 1984; in every quarter since, they have accounted for more than 
half of total bank failures. Agricultural banking in general has become 
substantially more fragile. In 1984, more than 20 percent of total 
agricultural oans outstanding at banks were to borrowers with a debt- 
equity ratio in excess of 70 percent and a negative cash flow. The 
government-sponsored Cooperative Farm Credit System (FCS) has 
suffered similar portfolio deterioration and now faces an imminent threat 
of insolvency, though legislation passed by Congress in 1985 provides 
for stopgap assistance from the federal government. Total outstanding 
farm loans likely to default have been estimated at between $80 billion 
and $100 billion.1 
Until recently, the major source of the U.S. farmers' trouble during 
the 1980s has been severe national and international economic shocks: 
increased foreign farm output, an overvalued dollar, and high U.S. 
interest rates. But U.S. farm credit markets have now become yet 
another source of trouble as they propagate the shocks in the farm 
sector.2 
1. These summary statistics are drawn from Emanuel Melichar and George D. Irwin, 
"Condition of Rural Financial Intermediaries," American Journal of Agricultural Eco- 
nomics, vol. 67 (December 1985, Proceedings Issue), pp. 1178-83; Dallas S. Batten and 
Michael T. Belongia, "Monetary Policy, Real Exchange Rates, and U.S. Agricultural 
Exports," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 68 (May 1986), pp. 422-27; 
Emanuel Melichar, "Agricultural Banks under Stress," Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 72 
(July 1986), pp. 437-48. 
2. This view of supply-side failures in credit markets as being an important determinant 
of economic activity has received increasing attention (see for example Ben Bernanke, 
Alan Blinder, and Benjamin Friedman). However, empirical attempts to ascertain the role 
of credit constraints in determining economic activity have been confined to historical 
data pertaining to the National Banking Era (in Charles Calomiris and Glenn Hubbard) or 
to the Great Depression (in Ben Bernanke). While these historical analyses are suggestive, 
more relevant to the issues raised in current deregulatory and farm policy debates would 
be an investigation of the quantitative importance of credit supply effects on output that 
might have arisen over the past several years in the farm sector. Ben S. Bernanke, 
"Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression," 
American Economic Review, vol. 73 (June 1983), pp. 259-76; Alan S. Blinder, "Credit 
Rationing and Effective Supply Failures," Working Paper 1619 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, May 1985); Benjamin M. Friedman, "The Relative Stability of Money 
and Credit 'Velocities' in the United States: Evidence and Some Speculations," Working 
Paper 645 (National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1981); Charles W. Calomiris 
and R. Glenn Hubbard, "Price Flexibility, Credit Rationing, and Economic Fluctuations: 
Evidence from the U.S., 1879-1914," Working Paper 1767 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, October 1985). 
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This paper examines potential imperfections in agricultural credit 
markets based on "agency" and "information" considerations. Infor- 
mation-intensive localized customer borrowing relationships, rather 
than impersonal debt and equity markets, are important in agricultural 
finance. Reliance on local relationships, however, is complicated by 
regulatory restrictions on the ability of local banks to diversify risks. 
Hence, even transitory deflationary shocks disturb the balance sheets 
of both borrowers and lenders and can have persistent real effects 
through fluctuations in credit availability. 
When loans are made with imperfect information on the part of the 
lender, the availability of credit necessary to finance operations depends 
on the health of local financial intermediaries, on farmers' cash flow, 
and on the collateral available to secure loans. Reduction in available 
credit due to increased borrower leverage, reduced cash flow, and 
increased bank vulnerability have amplified the recent shocks to agri- 
culture. As a result, relatively efficient farm producers may find them- 
selves going bankrupt, reducing investment and maintenance expendi- 
tures, or selling out to farmers or land speculators with greater access to 
loanable funds. 
The current economic upheaval in the U.S. farm sector raises impor- 
tant questions about public expenditures on domestic agriculture. While 
there is general agreement that current agricultural programs-farm 
credit and commodity programs dating from the 1930s-are poorly suited 
to addressing the problems of the 1980s, there is much less consensus 
about which new policy directions are likely to be the most efficient. A 
survey of the nation's agricultural credit markets suggests reforms that 
should be considered in the public debate. 
The paper is organized as follows. To put the current farm situation 
in perspective, we review briefly postwar U.S. agricultural market 
conditions. Next we discuss the effects of credit supply restrictions on 
farm production. In our empirical work, we examine a panel data base 
from farm income statements and balance sheets at the state level 
covering approximately the last decade. We find economically significant 
effects of changes in collateral value, debt service burdens, and the 
availability of commercial bank credit on farm output. 
The importance of local customer relationships in farm lending sug- 
gests roles for government intervention. To provide a framework for 
realistic policy analysis, we review recent developments in commercial 
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banks, the Farm Credit System, and the Farmers Home Administration, 
three major lenders. Our empirical findings suggest reforms of current 
government intervention in agricultural credit markets and proposals for 
promoting more extensive diversification of farm bank loan portfolios. 
The reforms imply a shift away from the current emphasis on agricultural 
price and incomes programs. 
A Review of U.S. Postwar Agricultural Conditions 
Productivity growth in U.S. agriculture over the postwar period has 
been phenomenal. From 1955 to 1984 the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
measure of total output per hour of farm labor increased fivefold, and 
average crop production per acre has increased 75 percent. At the same 
time, fluctuations in income have been substantial. 
Postwar economic conditions of U.S. agriculture can conveniently 
be divided into three distinct periods.3 The 1950s and 1960s were years 
of growing real farm incomes, although this growth lagged well behind 
that of overall U.S. economic activity. During the 1970s the relative 
decline was reversed, with rising commodity prices and sharply ex- 
panded exports leading to increasing farm incomes. Farmers expanded 
production, taking on substantial new debt to finance the expansion. 
Finally, during the 1980s farm prices declined, and, as the dollar 
appreciated, exports fell sharply. Farm incomes, and with them farmland 
values, fell at rates unprecedented in the postwar period. The drop in 
3. For reviews of problems of financial distress in U.S. agriculture during the interwar 
period, see Lee Alston and Albert Hart. Alston in particular notes a pattern similar to that 
experienced in recent years. An agricultural boom in cash crops occurred after World War 
I, accompanied by a large increase in mortgage debt to finance expansion. Land values fell 
subsequently in the mid-1920s and 1930s as expectations changed. The combination of 
high levels of debt service and restrictions of credit to agricultural borrowers led to the 
highest levels of foreclosure rates ever experienced in U.S. agriculture. Indeed, James 
Stock argues that high leveraging, heavy debt service burdens, and the associated risk of 
foreclosure were central to the agrarian unrest movements before World War I. Lee J. 
Alston, "Farm Foreclosures in the United States during the Interwar Period," Journal of 
Economic History, vol. 43 (December 1983), pp. 885-903; Albert G. Hart, Debts and 
Recovery: A Study of Changes in the Internal Debt Structure from 1929 to 1937 and a 
Program for the Future (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1938); James H. Stock, 
"Real Estate Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Midwestern Agrarian Unrest, 1865-1920," 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 43 (March 1984), pp. 89-105. 
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income, coupled with the high levels of debt acquired during the 
expansion of the 1970s, has led to a sharp decline in the ability of farmers 
to meet their debt obligations and to the corresponding rise in farm bank 
failures. 
These patterns are illustrated in tables 1 and 2, which contain selected 
series describing farm income and the balance sheet of the farm sector. 
Relative to aggregate economic activity, farming has been on the decline 
throughout he postwar period. The decline was slow but steady through 
the 1950s and 1960s. In 1954, agricultural income was 9.2 percent of 
GNP; by 1970, the fraction had dropped to 5.8 percent. Over the same 
period, farm income increased by only 0.6 percent annually. With the 
exception of 1958, between 1954 and 1970 the rate of return to assets in 
farming activities fluctuated between 1.0 and 6.3 percent. 
The prolonged period of steady decline was reversed with the increase 
in farm exports and the rise in relative commodity prices during the 
1970s. Between 1970 and 1979, real U.S. agricultural exports more than 
doubled, and real gross farm income rose at an annual rate of 4.1 percent. 
The return on farm assets and the value of farm equity rose, reflecting 
the improved market conditions. Nationally, real farm equity rose by 80 
percent and real farmland values rose by 88 percent from 1971 to 1980. 
The increases were most pronounced in the West and Middle West; 
between 1976 and 1980 alone, land values rose by 53 percent in Indiana, 
49 percent in Minnesota, and 46 percent in Wisconsin and Iowa.4 Backed 
by this increased "paper value" of farmland, real farm debt rose by a 
total of 66 percent from 1971 to 1980, compared with 57 percent from 
1961 to 1970. The ratio of farm debt to equity rose from an average of 
0.13 for the 1950s to an average of 0.21 for the 1970s, reflecting sanguine 
expectations of growth in farm income. 
The expansion halted abruptly in the 1980s as interest rates rose, the 
dollar appreciated, and commodity prices fell. From 1979 to 1983, the 
agricultural sector suffered an absolute as well as a relative decline that 
was largely unanticipated by agricultural borrowers and lenders. The 
United States experienced a loss in market share in many crops during 
the 1980s. Farm income as a fraction of gross national product dropped 
from 5.5 percent in 1980 to 4.6 percent in 1984, and aggregate real farm 
4. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, "Farm Real Estate 
Market Developments: Outlook and Situation Report" (USDA, August 1984). 
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Table 1. Farm Income, Borrowing, and Investment, 1950-84 
Billions of 1984 dollars 
Total 
return Interest Capital expenditure 
Gross from Net on 
Year income assetsa borrowing debt Buildings Machinery 
1950 123.7 46.7 5.3 2.2 3.4 12.2 
1951 134.5 42.5 6.0 2.4 3.4 12.1 
1952 129.0 - 10.8 2.7 2.6 3.4 10.5 
1953 114.9 - 14.6 -1.3 2.5 3.2 11.2 
1954 113.2 14.1 2.8 2.6 3.0 9.5 
1955 109.4 13.7 4.7 2.7 2.9 9.5 
1956 109.1 25.5 2.6 2.9 2.9 8.1 
1957 108.1 19.2 4.3 3.0 2.8 8.2 
1958 119.0 49.0 5.9 3.2 2.7 10.0 
1959 112.8 5.5 7.1 3.6 3.5 10.7 
1960 113.6 6.8 3.4 3.9 3.7 8.6 
1961 117.3 28.5 5.1 4.1 3.5 8.7 
1962 120.7 20.4 7.6 4.4 3.8 9.5 
1963 121.7 22.9 8.4 4.9 3.9 10.4 
1964 116.5 24.2 7.8 5.2 3.9 11.0 
1965 126.5 38.8 10.5 5.7 4.0 11.9 
1966 133.6 28.6 9.3 6.1 4.1 12.8 
1967 130.0 17.8 8.0 6.7 4.6 13.9 
1968 128.3 10.2 4.3 6.9 4.2 11.9 
1969 133.6 7.2 6.1 7.2 4.2 11.3 
1970 133.0 8.2 5.6 7.6 4.5 11.7 
1971 134.6 36.3 10.1 7.7 4.4 11.1 
1972 149.3 83.3 11.9 8.1 3.9 12.6 
1973 198.3 146.9 18.7 9.2 5.3 16.0 
1974 177.3 35.9 15.7 10.3 6.2 15.5 
1975 167.9 94.5 16.2 10.7 6.6 15.2 
1976 162.3 109.8 18.5 11.7 6.6 16.7 
1977 160.9 57.6 22.9 12.9 7.0 16.8 
1978 176.5 120.7 23.5 14.5 7.7 18.8 
1979 191.6 87.9 32.4 17.0 7.6 19.4 
1980 171.4 10.6 18.8 19.3 6.4 15.7 
1981 176.4 - 61.4 17.7 21.7 5.3 13.8 
1982 159.4 - 59.9 7.8 22.8 4.0 10.5 
1983 143.5 - 23.2 3.4 21.0 3.4 10.1 
1984 161.8 -96.3 - 1.4 21.5 3.0 9.5 
Source: Emanuel Melichar, Agricultural Finance Databook (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Division of Research and Statistics, July 1985), tables 112 and 122. 
a. Includes capital gains (or losses) on assets. 
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Table 2. Synopsis of Farm Sector Balance Sheet and Rates of Return, 1950-84 
Billions of 1984 dollars unless otherwise indicated 
Total rate Total rate 
Farm balance sheet of return of return 
to assets to equity 
Year Assets Debt Equity (percent)a (percent)a 
1950 445.5 44.3 401.1 10.5 11.7 
1951 473.1 45.1 428.0 9.0 9.8 
1952 482.5 49.0 433.5 - 2.2 - 2.9 
1953 463.5 51.9 411.6 -3.2 -4.0 
1954 460.3 54.1 406.3 3.1 2.9 
1955 467.3 56.3 410.9 2.9 2.9 
1956 478.0 57.8 420.2 5.3 5.8 
1957 489.0 58.3 430.7 3.9 4.2 
1958 517.2 63.6 453.5 9.5 10.3 
1959 535.9 68.7 467.2 1.0 0.7 
1960 533.2 70.9 462.3 1.3 0.9 
1961 543.1 75.5 467.6 5.2 5.3 
1962 558.8 81.7 477.1 3.7 3.6 
1963 573.4 88.5 484.9 4.0 4.0 
1964 587.4 94.5 492.8 4.1 4.1 
1965 611.3 101.3 510.1 6.3 6.9 
1966 634.4 107.7 526.7 4.5 4.8 
1967 652.4 113.6 538.8 2.7 2.7 
1968 660.8 117.3 543.5 1.5 1.5 
1969 663.3 119.0 544.3 1.1 1.0 
1970 658.9 118.5 540.4 1.2 1.0 
1971 668.8 120.9 548.0 5.4 6.0 
1972 714.0 127.4 586.7 11.7 13.6 
1973 798.8 133.9 664.9 18.4 22.2 
1974 822.1 136.5 685.7 4.4 5.6 
1975 844.2 141.8 702.4 11.2 13.0 
1976 927.4 152.5 774.9 11.8 13.6 
1977 993.0 167.7 825.3 5.8 6.5 
1978 1,071.8 182.5 889.3 11.3 13.5 
1979 1,159.9 194.8 965.2 7.6 9.1 
1980 1,185.6 200.5 985.1 0.9 1.0 
1981 1,140.6 203.7 936.9 -5.4 -7.4 
1982 1,065.0 210.0 854.9 - 5.6 - 8.6 
1983 1,002.1 209.6 792.5 - 2.3 -4.7 
1984 911.9 200.7 711.2 - 10.6 - 15.7 
Source: Melichar, Agricultural Finatnce Databook, table 101. 
a. The total rate of return is the sum of the income rate of return and real capital gains. 
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income fell. The previous trend of increasing equity values also reversed 
as land prices fell; real national farm equity in 1984 was only 72 percent 
of its peak in 1980.5 With the fall in farm income and equity values came 
increased payments on the debt accrued during the 1970s and the lowest 
levels of investment in buildings and machinery since the early 1960s. 
CHANGING VOLATILITY OF FARM INCOMES 
Throughout the postwar period farm income has been volatile. That 
volatility increased, however, during the 1970s and 1980s, as summarized 
in the first four columns of table 3, which show the standard deviation of 
annual growth rates of farm income almost tripling, from 4.5 percent to 
12.1 percent, from 1954-72 to 1973-84. As a comparison, the standard 
deyiations of the growth rate in real national income were 2.8 percent 
for 1954-72 and 3.8 percent for 1973-84, respectively. 
The increased volatility of farm income since 1973 has also been 
associated with an increase in the correlation of agricultural income and 
U.S. aggregate economic conditions, as reflected in the regressions 
reported in the remaining four columns of table 3. When the growth rate 
in farm income is regressed against the contemporaneous and lagged 
values of the growth rates of various income aggregates, two features of 
the changing relationship between movements in farm incomes and in 
various economic aggregates are evident. First, while the multiple 
correlation between farm income and lags of national income was only 
3 percent for 1954-72, after 1973 it rose to 55 percent. Second, fluctua- 
tions in the various aggregates were associated with very different 
changes in farm incomes in the two periods. For example, in the early 
period, the cumulative change in real farm income associated with a 1 
percent change in real national income was only 0.27 percent; in the later 
period the change was about 3 percent. 
5. In addition to reflecting the decline in the relative price of agricultural commodities, 
the decline in farmland values in the 1980s may well have been exacerbated by the general 
reduction in inflation. For example, Martin Feldstein has shown that the relative price of 
land (and of other nondepreciating real stores of value) will increase with inflation in the 
presence of unindexed taxes on capital income. Martin Feldstein, "Inflation, Tax Rules, 
and the Prices of Land and Gold," Journal of Public Economics, vol. 14 (December 1980), 
pp. 309-18. 
Charles W. Calomiris, R. Glenn Hubbard, and James H. Stock 449 
As has been discussed extensively elsewhere, the changing relation- 
ships elaborated above reflect an increased importance of world trade 
and of the exchange rate in determining domestic commodity prices and 
therefore farm incomes. Indeed, while farm exports constituted only 
14.5 percent of U.S. agricultural cash receipts in 1970, the fraction had 
jumped to 29.5 percent by 1980. To the extent that the United States 
continues to compete in international agricultural markets, the increased 
sensitivity of agricultural incomes to world economic fluctuations seems 
likely to persist. 
In years past, prices received by farmers were relatively stable, and 
agricultural income risk was likely to be uncorrelated with risk in other 
major sectors in the economy. Weather was usually the dominant source 
of fluctuations in farm output. The increasing risks faced by farmers 
today would not be of critical importance if farmers were able to diversify 
risk by' holding part of their net worth in assets whose returns perform 
differently given fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates. 
Unfortunately, however, farmers' wealth is held almost exclusively in 
farm-specific capital, such as farmland. Individual farmers are thus 
bearing more significant risks of income fluctuations than ever before.6 
Given the increasing potential costliness of concentrating wealth in 
farmland, it remains to be explained why farmers chose to do so. We 
argue below that agency considerations provide a motivation for linking 
farm operation and ownership. 
PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD AGRICULTURE 
Federal support for agriculture has taken two principal forms over 
the past fifty years: commodity programs and credit market programs. 
In recent years the commodity programs have become so expensive- 
and have apparently been so ineffectual-as to warrant a greater reliance 
on the credit market programs, which we discuss at greater length 
shortly. 
6. The analysis follows the general discussion of the allocation of risk by William 
Brainard and F. T. Dolbear. We emphasize that farmers rely heavily on localized loan 
markets, often with limited potential for diversification, largely because of branching 
restrictions on commercial banks. William Brainard and F. T. Dolbear, "Social Risk and 
Financial Markets," American Economic Review, vol. 61 (May 1971, Papers and Pro- 
ceedings, 1970), pp. 360-70. 
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The foundation of federal farm commodity programs has been price 
supports and concomitant acreage-reduction efforts. The latter were 
implemented through a set of incentive programs put in place in the 
1960s, by which time it had become clear that, since the support price 
was effectively a floor price, farmers who chose not to reduce their 
acreage reaped the benefit of both higher production and higher prices. 
Nevertheless, the support and acreage-reduction programs were not 
overly costly in the 1970s, a period of rapid expansion and market price 
increases. 
By the 1980s, world farm prices had declined, and more farmers were 
choosing to participate in government commodity programs. The budg- 
etary costs grew as agricultural productive capacity expanded abroad, 
particularly in grains in Argentina and the European Economic Com- 
munity. The 1981 farm bill, predicted to cost $11 billion over the ensuing 
four years, actually cost $63 billion. The Reagan administration's 1983 
Payment-In-Kind program attempted large acreage reductions at a cost 
of $30,000 per commercial farm in 1983.7 Expenditures on price supports 
and acreage-reduction programs in 1986 are projected to amount to 
between $26 billion and $30 billion-a per-farmer average of between 
$11,000 and $12,500.8 Discussions of "bailouts" have figured promi- 
nently in 1985 and 1986 legislative efforts. 
We argue below that the cost to the government of aiding farmers 
through improvements in agricultural credit market conditions compares 
favorably with the cost of commodity programs. 
Agricultural Credit Markets and Farm Production 
It is our contention that the crisis in agricultural credit markets is not 
merely a symptom of the recent adverse shocks farmers have suffered, 
but a means by which exogenous adverse shocks are worsened. The 
availability of credit per se provides an additional influence on agricul- 
tural income and investment. 
7. See David H. Harrington and Alden C. Manchester, "Profile of the U.S. Farm 
Sector," Agricultural-Food Policy Review (USDA, 1985), pp. 25-53. 
8. For a recent review of U.S. agricultural policies, see Elmer W. Learn, Philip L. 
Martin, and Alex F. McCalla, "American Farm Subsidies: A Bumper Crop," The Public 
Interest, no. 84 (Summer 1986), pp. 66-78. 
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To motivate empirical work that addresses these questions, we begin 
with a simple model of links between credit markets and farm output. 
Suppose that domestic farm output, Qs, is determined according to a 
production function defined over a set of inputs (chosen before produc- 
tion takes place) and is subject to random disturbances, such as the 
weather. The associated derived demands for inputs and financing 
depend on expected returns on investment, R (that is, expected prices 
and yields), and on the shadow price of funds, is.9 Individual farmers 
invest until the expected return on the margin just equals the shadow 
price of funds. 
The shadow price of funds involves much more than the loan interest 
rate; even casual observation of existing loan contracts reveals the 
importance of requirements for collateral, debt service, and other 
"nonprice" covenants. Three restrictions on credit availability are of 
particular relevance here: the importance of collateral and projected 
cash flow for obtaining loans and the attendant problems associated with 
reductions in the value of collateral, agency problems limiting the ability 
of individual farmers to raise new capital externally, and problems of 
credit rationing given lenders' imperfect information about borrowers' 
conditions. '0 We discuss these in turn below; they certainly need not be 
mutually exclusive. 
Collateral requirements provide a way for lenders to overcome their 
limited information about the ability of individual farmers to pay back 
loans. Lenders will receive either the total repaid principal plus interest 
or, if the farmer defaults, the value of the collateral plus any additional 
recoverable cash flow. That is, lenders can be thought of as maximizing 
9. We implicitly assume that all investment is financed by debt. Later we discuss 
potential agency problems with equity finance. See Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler, 
"Financial Efficiency, Collateral, and Business Fluctuations" (Princeton University, 
1986); Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz, "Information, Finance Constraints, and 
Business Fluctuations" (Princeton University, 1986). 
10. These credit market imperfections are likely to apply to many types of small 
businesses. There are reasons, however, to believe that they may be relatively more 
severe for farmers. First, farmers are subject to much greater income volatility than the 
typical proprietor. Second, the production process in agriculture is capital(land)-intensive, 
and the minimum investment required is much larger than that for a typical small business 
with similar sales. Third, the nature of the production process works against farmers with 
respect to cash flow: there is a long period between the purchase of inputs and the sale of 
output, and short-run variable costs are a small portion of total costs. 
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their gross return, p, which is related to the loan interest rate, r, according 
to 
(1) p = min[R + C, (1 +r)L], 
where L is the loan amount and C is the borrower's collateral. Deterio- 
ration of borrowers' collateral or in the projected ability to service 
existing debts out of current cash flow exacerbates the information 
problems in the loan market, as discussed later. Were collateral substan- 
tial enough, it might be possible to approximate loan contracts equivalent 
to those that could be written were the lenders fully informed, since only 
low-risk borrowers-those confident of not losing their collateral- 
would seek loans. 
Farmers' collateral is composed largely of an industry-specific asset, 
farmland, fluctuations in the value of which are highly positively corre- 
lated with realizations of returns on farming projects. The risk of default 
is thus more substantial than in cases where the value of collateral is 
fixed and independent of project returns." Hence the ability to service 
debt out of projected cash flow is an important additional consideration 
for the lender. Cash flow also influences credit availability through 
individual farmers who lend surplus cash to neighbors and relatives. 
When farmers have no surplus cash, the supply of private intermediation 
capital, which accounted for 34 percent of total farm debt in 1984, 
naturally drops. 
The relevance of collateral and cash flow is also evident from the 
criteria that lenders actually use in deciding upon loans. For example, 
until 1971 Federal Land Banks could lend no more than 50 percent of 
the market value of real estate for which the loan was taken. When, in 
1971, the limit was increased to 85 percent, member banks, recognizing 
that lending up to the limit was risky, increased their emphasis on the 
cash flow of the applicant.'2 In addition, cash-flow analysis and real 
estate appraisal have always figured prominently in the loan supply 
11. This argument relates well to discussions of "debt-deflation" episodes, in which 
wealth is redistributed from entrepreneurs to savers, with associated declines in the ability 
to obtain loans to finance productive investments. See Irving Fisher, "The Debt-Deflation 
Theory of Great Depressions," Econometrica, vol. 1 (October 1933), pp. 337-57; Ber- 
nanke, "Nonmonetary Effects"; Calomiris and Hubbard, "Price Flexibility." 
12. Personal communication, James M. Schurr, Senior Vice President, Credit Stand- 
ards, Farm Credit Corporation of America. 
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decisions of commercial banks and in the Farmers Home Administra- 
tion's evaluation of a potential borrower's "Farm and Home Plan." 
The second restriction on credit availability involves "agency" 
problems. For credit restrictions to individual borrowers to have aggre- 
gate real effects, it must be the case that individual projects are imperfect 
substitutes for each other. There are several channels through which a 
lack of farm credit could have these aggregate effects. When farms suffer 
foreclosure and are not brought back into operation-or, even more 
dramatically, when farms are put up for sale and standing crops are not 
harvested-an aggregate drop in planted acreage and production results. 
More subtly, a lack of credit can lower productivity by forcing the sale 
of farm equipment, by reducing maintenance in building and equipment, 
by reducing fertilizer or seed qualities, or by forcing shifts to suboptimal 
crop or feed mixes to reduce operating expenses. Each of these channels 
results in output losses on specific farms. Since the farmland can be 
farmed at any one time by only a single operator, credit restrictions can 
in theory result in aggregate reductions in output. 
Because of the complexity of modern farming operations, it can be 
difficult for outside parties to monitor these and similar subtle changes 
in production. When farm ownership is dissociated from farm manage- 
ment, losses of efficiency can thus occur because of "agency" prob- 
lems.'3 Attempts to raise collateral levels by mergers of existing farm 
operations by owner-operators would not be useful so long as the farmers 
have similar debt-equity ratios. One possible alternative solution is to 
take on new equity from nonfarmers. Potential agency costs are the 
likely explanation of why this option is so seldom used. 14 
13. Given asymmetries of information, contractual arrangements between borrowers 
and lenders cannot produce the same level of mutual benefit as would have been possible 
with costless information or costless aligning of the incentives of the parties to perform. 
See the general discussion of agency considerations in Michael C. Jensen and William H. 
Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3 (October 1976), pp. 305-60; Michael 
C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, "Rights and Production Functions: An Application 
to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination," Journal of Business, vol. 52 (October 
1979), pp. 464-506; Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Economics of Agency," in John W. Pratt 
and Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business 
(Harvard Business School Press, 1985), pp. 37-51. 
14. For a general discussion of constraints on equity financing, see Bruce Greenwald, 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss, "Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market 
and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," American Economic Review, vol. 74 (May 1984, 
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The third restriction on credit availability involves problems of 
information. Theoretical research involving models of loan markets in 
which information between borrowers and lenders is asymmetric has 
shown that the loan interest rate and the shadow price of credit are not 
equivalent. Agricultural projects are "information-intensive" invest- 
ments to the extent that monitoring of projects, and associated treatment 
of the land, and returns is difficult. In these information-intensive credit 
markets, credit rationing to some borrowers is likely. 15 
In the simplest possible model, no information problems exist, and 
the competitive equilibrium involves the agricultural credit markets 
clearing through adjustments in the rate of interest. However, when 
agricultural borrowers have private information about their project 
returns, lenders cannot distinguish the riskiness of individual projects, 
so that adverse selection will lead to credit rationing in a credit market 
equilibrium in which loan contracts specify only the interest rate. 16 With 
a nonzero probability of default, lenders consider the potential for loan 
repayment as well as the interest rate to be charged when assessing the 
profitability of a loan. Past some critical level of the interest rate, high- 
quality borrowers will either seek loanable funds elsewhere or leave the 
Papers and Proceedings, 1983), pp. 194-200; Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf, 
"Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That 
Investors Do Not Have," Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 13 (June 1984), pp. 187- 
221. Tenure arrangements separating land ownership from farm operations can also 
discourage soil conservation (reducing future output) through short-term leases or in- 
equitable sharing of the costs and benefits of conservation investments. See Sigfried von 
Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation Economics and Policies (University of Califor- 
nia Press, 1963); Linda K. Lee and William H. Stewart, "Landownership and the Adoption 
of Minimum Tillage," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, vol. 65 (May 1983), 
pp. 256-64. 
15. See, for example, Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell, "Imperfect Information, 
Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 90 (November 
1976), pp. 651-66; Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, "Credit Rationing in Markets 
with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, vol. 71 (June 1981), pp. 393- 
410; Bernanke, "Nonmonetary Effects"; N. Gregory Mankiw, "The Allocation of Credit 
and Financial Collapse," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 101 (August 1986), pp. 
455-70; Charles W. Calomiris and R. Glenn Hubbard, "Imperfect Information, Multiple 
Loan Markets, and 'Credit Rationing' "(Northwestern University, 1986). 
16. An important contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss is that imperfect information can 
limit the number of loans a "bank" will make; that is, "credit rationing" occurs in the 
sense that, within a class of observationally equivalent borrowers, not all receive loans. 
Stiglitz and Weiss, "Credit Rationing." 
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credit market. As a result, banks charging high interest rates will find 
themselves with a preponderance of borrowers who have a high prob- 
ability of default. 
A corollary to these arguments for capital market imperfections is 
that changes in the ability of lenders specializing in monitoring infor- 
mation-intensive projects-here, commercial banks-to supply credit 
can have real effects. Agricultural banks are especially subject to such 
changes, for two reasons. First, state limitations on branch banking 
impede loan diversification, making farm banks particularly vulnerable 
to changes in local conditions. Second, as a recent evaluation of farm 
bank failures by Gregory Gajewski notes, banks taking over failed banks 
tend to be more conservative than average, making a smaller proportion 
of funds available for loans. 17 Furthermore, the Federal Deposit Insur- 
ance Corporation (FDIC) has had difficulty finding suitable banks willing 
to take over failed rural banks. While it failed to obtain an acceptable 
bid to take over failed banks, and therefore used the "payoff" method 
of liquidation, in only 33 out of 239 bank failures from 1983 to 1985, fully 
24 such closings were in rural banks concentrated in such agricultural 
states as Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas. 
From the perspective of credit supply constraints these failures are 
particularly worrisome since local commercial banks have specialized 
in making and monitoring information-intensive loans and exploiting 
their customer relationships; the recent increase in bank failures is likely 
to disrupt the availability of credit to farmers. In addition, deterioration 
of the portfolios of surviving commercial banks, FCS intermediaries, 
and the Farmers Home Administration is likely to lead to greater 
conservatism of lenders. 
Based on these credit market imperfections, we emphasize four 
potentially important components of the shadow price of credit to 
agricultural borrowers-the interest rate charged, r; the value of farm 
real estate, RE, as collateral; the projected debt service burden, DS, 
measured as the ratio of interest payments to cash receipts; and disrup- 
tions in the availability of information-intensive credit, measured by 
17. Gregory Gajewski, "Rural Bank Failures: Not a Problem-So Far" (USDA, 
Economic Research Service, 1986). See also "Agricultural Conditions and the Prospects 
for Farm Banks," F.D.I.C. Banking and Economic Review, vol. 4 (March 1986), pp. 3-9. 
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bank failures, FAILS. That is, the shadow price of funds in period t - 1 
is 
(2) i[t51 = f (rt -1, REt - 1, t -1DSt, FAILSt -1). 
The proper model, is, of course, for investment. As we do not have 
data on investment, we consider a reduced-form equation for farm 
output: 18 
(3) Q~~ts fG,_ R,, rt_1, REt,_ t ,_ DSt, FAILSt_1), 
where ,- iRt represents the expectation of Rt, the total return on the farm 
project, at time t- 1 and where the predicted signs underscore the 
variables. 19 
Empirical Evidence on Credit Supply Restrictions in U.S. 
Agriculture 
Macroeconomic time series data are not likely to be particularly useful 
for testing the impact of proxies for credit supply restrictions on farm 
output and income, because they cannot permit consideration of the 
large variation among farms in terms of crop mix (and hence expected 
crop prices), debt service capability, collateral, and situations in local 
credit markets. An alternative would be to examine microeconomic data 
on individual borrower-lender elationships over time. Although data on 
individual borrowers would permit estimation of microeconomic fea- 
tures of credit supply restrictions, they would not permit measuring 
directly the net aggregate effect of credit rationing on aggregate agricul- 
tural supply. As an intermediate step, we constructed a panel data base 
on farm income statements and balance sheets and commercial bank 
18. There is evidence in the literature for credit effects on such long-term investments 
as soil conservation. We discuss this point later. 
19. The ability of fluctuations in credit availability to affect producers' incomes 
depends, of course, on the sensitivity of total demand (including net foreign demand) to 
changes in price. Appreciation of the dollar and expansion of agricultural capacity abroad 
have made the total demand for U.S. farm goods substantially price-elastic. Reductions in 
farm output because of credit restrictions are thus likely to result in lower farm incomes. 
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performance at the state level covering twenty-four states, including all 
of the principal agricultural states, from 1977 through 1984.20 For 
complete documentation of data, see the appendix. 
Observations consist of state-level totals or averages for a given year. 
For example, the real estate variable is the value of farmland in the state 
as of January 1 of the year in question. Given the data, we estimate 
equations of the form 
(4) Qs = f (,-,Ri,, rit-,, REit1, ,_, DSit FAILSit_, Xi, Z,), 
where i and t denote the state and year, respectively, and X and Z denote 
a set of fixed state and time effects. The dependent variable used in the 
econometric work is a quantity index, constructed as the logarithm of 
the quotient of state cash receipts from marketing and a state-specific 
commodity price index. 
No expected price term per se appears in our estimation of equation 
4. Variables describing the demand for agricultural output will in general 
appear in any reduced-form equation. Rather than attempting to model 
annual aggregate demand shifts, we have included dummy variables for 
each year in our regression equations. Expected price changes are 
captured by the year dummies, which reflect changes in global aggregate 
economic activity, production, and the exchange rate, and by the state 
fixed effects, which capture state-level variation in the crop mix. 
As we do not have data on farm interest rates state by state, no loan 
interest rate is included directly (because of the inclusion of the fixed 
time effects). Collateral is measured by the logarithm of constant-dollar 
real estate values, and debt service burdens are proxied by the ratio of 
interest payments to total cash flow, including government payments 
and nonfarm income. The bank failure measure is the total number of 
20. The data used are not available before 1977. Our sample includes all states that 
were either among the top twenty states in total farm cash receipts in 1982, or among the 
top ten states in wheat cash receipts in 1982, or both, with the exception of Florida, whose 
crop share changed sufficiently over the sample period to make the assumption of our 
fixed-effects model questionable. To this group we added South Dakota, leaving the 
following twenty-four states in our sample: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Because data on loan charge-offs were not 
available for North Carolina and Washington, the regressions involving this variable used 
only twenty-two states. 
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bank failures in that state in that year. As another proxy for supply 
restrictions we include net loan charge-offs as a percentage of total loans 
at agricultural banks in that state in that year. 
In addition to the specification in equation 4, we also considered 
various interactions with the debt service variable to test whether effects 
of debt service on credit availability vary according to initial leverage 
(as measured by the debt-equity ration, DIE), and whether given levels 
of debt service burdens are more severe for farms of moderate size, FS, 
than for large farms. For this second interaction, we define FS as the 
fraction of output produced in each state by farms of moderate size- 
those with total sales between $40,000 and $100,000 in 1982. The farm 
size variable is a proxy for the distribution of debt burden within a 
particular state. Given that large farms tend to have higher-than-average 
debt-equity ratios, a high proportion of moderate-sized farms in a given 
state indicates a more even distribution of debt among farmers and hence 
less vulnerability in the aggregate to shocks that increase the debt-equity 
ratio. 
Our estimation strategy is designed to avoid two potential pitfalls that 
would arise were one to use ordinary least squares in an attempt to 
identify the credit supply effects embodied in the theoretical relationship, 
equation 3. First, persistent differences from state to state in crop and 
livestock mixes, and thus in credit requirements as inputs to production 
functions, could lead to spurious significance of the credit variables; we 
avoid this potential problem by estimating the regressions using fixed 
state effects. Second, because of the obvious potential simultaneity of 
credit demand and the supply of output, we estimate our output equations 
using two-stage least squares. We use as instruments lagged endogenous 
variables and their interactions with survey responses of agricultural 
bankers indicating whether their expectations were for increased or 
decreased loan demand in the next quarter.21 The latter is designed to 
capture pure demand effects. Though not reported here, our results are 
robust to the use instead of lagged values of the independent variables. 
Our two-stage least squares estimation results using fixed state and 
time effects appear in table 4. The estimated regression coefficients and 
21. We use an annual average of a quarterly time series of survey responses of 
agricultural bankers to indicate whether their expectations were for increased or decreased 
loan demand in the next quarter. The expectations data were taken from the Agricultural 
Credit Conditions Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
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their t-statistics are reported in the first six columns. The seventh and 
eighth columns contain the F-statistics (and their P-values) for tests that 
the credit supply variables equal zero, and the final three columns contain 
measures of the serial correlation present in the residuals. The Box- 
Pierce Q statistics and the estimated serial correlation coefficients 
indicate slight but statistically significant serial correlation in the resid- 
uals, which is unsurprising since we omitted some variables, such as 
factor prices, either because they were unavailable or because they were 
not germane to this investigation. The reported standard errors have 
been adjusted to correct for this serial correlation.22 
Several patterns in these results are of particular interest. The impact 
on output of changes in collateral values or in the local provision of 
information-intensive credit (as measured by real estate values and 
commercial bank failures, respectively) have the expected sign and are 
precisely estimated. Increases in debt service burdens (interestpayments 
relative to cash receipts) are associated with reductions in output, though 
the coefficient is in some cases imprecisely measured. As one would 
expect, given levels of debt service burdens have a more substantial 
effect when debt-equity ratios are high, although this effect is not 
statistically significant.23 
Local bank failures reduce output by restricting the available supply 
of credit; we discuss this point in more detail later in the context of 
regulatory restrictions on commercial bank lending. Estimated coeffi- 
cients on the loan charge-offs measures are never statistically signifi- 
cantly different from zero, though their inclusion sharpens the precision 
of the estimates of the effects of the debt service variable. While the 
effect of bank failures may seem large at first glance, it is important to 
note that such failures are discrete proxies for many continuous and 
persistent changes such as in the quality of bank loan portfolios. 
Debt service burdens have a less severe impact for medium-sized 
farms than for other farms. If credit constraints are less relevant for 
borrowers with "deep pockets" and if the large farms in our sample 
22. The correction entailed estimating the mean temporal error covariance matrix for 
each state and then using this estimate to compute the adjusted coefficient covariance 
matrix. 
23. Our results with respect to credit variables are robust to using constant-dollar cash 
receipts as the dependent variable and to including the state-specific relative prices of farm 
products as an additional regressor, although this price variable formally should not enter 
the reduced-form specification. 
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became large because of higher-than-average leveraging, then, for a 
given statewide average debt service ratio, the more moderate-sized 
farms will have less binding credit constraints. This interpretation of the 
coefficient on DS*FS is consistent with the relatively high debt-equity 
ratios of large farms in the boom years of the 1970s presented in table 5. 
Issues of interpretation arise over any empirical results attempting to 
separate credit supply and demand effects. For example, in addition to 
serving as collateral, land values will tend to reflect market expectations 
of future farm cash flows, thus agricultural prices.24 If, however, prices 
for particular commodities are the same in all states, if expectations of 
prices are similar in all states, and if each state's crop mix is relatively 
stable from year to year, then, as argued above, fixed state and time 
effects will capture both expected prices and realized agricultural de- 
mand. 
A possible confusion between supply and demand effects arises in the 
debt service measure, where high values of debt service may indicate 
sanguine expectations. Here, the demand-side effect leads one to expect 
a positive coefficient, which is opposite to the negative coefficient implied 
by the credit supply effect and the negative coefficients estimated by 
two-stage least squares reported in table 4. 
Finally, there is independent evidence of credit supply restrictions on 
the part of commercial banks. Quarterly surveys of credit conditions at 
commercial banks by the regional Federal Reserve Banks in Chicago, 
Kansas City, Dallas, Minneapolis, and Richmond indicate a marked 
decline in 1982 in the number of banks reporting a "higher" availability 
of funds for new farm loans and a substantial increase in the percentage 
of banks reporting that more collateral would be required relative to loan 
size.25 
An explanation for our empirical results that does not involve credit 
rationing is that declines in farm output result in bank failures and that 
farm output is serially correlated. According to that interpretation, the 
bank failures variable might spuriously be capturing this dependence on 
farm output. To check for this possibility, we examined the time series 
relationship between the credit variables and the output variable. In both 
24. This long-run perspective must be qualified to the extent that liquidity constraints 
raise the discount rate for calculating the present value of land. 
25. These data are summarized in Emanuel Melichar, Agricultural Finance Databook 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Research and Statistics, 
July 1985). 
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a bivariate model of bank failures and the logarithm of output and a 
trivariate model of bank failures, the logarithm of loan charge-offs, and 
the logarithm of output, the output variable failed to Granger-cause the 
banking variables at a 15 percent level. (Both models included state and 
time fixed effects.) In contrast, as expected, real farm income does 
Granger-cause bank failures at the 5 percent level in both the bivariate 
and trivariate models, although the link from farm income to loan charge- 
offs is, somewhat surprisingly, weaker. Taken together, these results 
suggest that this alternative explanation will not explain the results in 
table 4. 
Financial Variables and the Trend Toward Larger Farms 
An important characteristic of U.S. agriculture in the postwar period 
has been a trend toward larger and more productive farms.26 As table 6 
shows, by 1984 U.S. farm size, as measured by real crop sales, had 
almost tripled since 1960, with the fastest growth occurring in the 1960s. 
The literature on farm production suggests two reasons for increasing 
Table 5. Debt-Asset Ratios by Value of Sales Class, 1975-78 
Percent 
Value of sales class in dollars 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Greater than 100,000 27.6 25.3 25.2 22.7 
40,000-99,999 18.5 17.6 18.1 19.8 
20,000-39,999 14.6 15.0 14.0 15.8 
10,000-19,999 9.6 11.9 12.2 14.8 
5,000-9,999 6.6 7.3 7.4 9.1 
2,500-4,999 7.6 5.5 5.6 9.0 
Less than 2,499 3.3 4.7 4.2 6.3 
All 15.8 15.7 15.7 16.7 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: 
National Financial Summary 1980 (GPO, 1981). 
26. Farm size statistics are conventionally reported in intervals of nominal dollars of 
sales (for example, the number of farms with sales between $20,000 and $39,999). We have 
deflated these nominal dollar values using the farm price index to compute selected farm 
size statistics in 1984 dollars. Distributions for aggregate sales and income were constructed 
from data on the number of farms with sales or income in various nominal ranges, which 
were deflated by the farm price index and then used to estimate lognormal distributions. 
Sales and income data are from USDA, Economic Research Service, Economic Indicators 
of the Farm Sector: National Financial Summary 1984 (GPO, 1986), tables 27 and 30. The 
farm price index is from the Economic Report of the President. 
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farm sizes. The most important is surely the tremendous increase in 
productivity in agriculture in terms of output per acre. Technological 
advances tend to increase the minimum scale for efficient farming 
operations, although the minimum scale necessarily varies with the crop 
mix. In a detailed review of studies on the minimum efficient scale for 




Number offarms from 
Distribution of (thousands) farms 
sales per farm with 
(thousands of 1984 dollars) With sales of 
____________________________ ~sales of $50,000- 
Ninetieth $50,000- $150,000 
Year Mean Median percentile Total $150,000 (percent) 
1960 22.7 7.8 51.5 3963 322 29.2 
1961 24.4 8.1 55.9 3825 334 29.3 
1962 25.8 8.2 60.1 3692 339 29.4 
1963 28.0 8.6 66.2 3572 351 29.7 
1964 29.2 8.9 69.2 3457 351 29.8 
1965 30.4 8.8 71.3 3356 344 29.3 
1966 32.2 8.7 73.8 3257 337 28.9 
1967 34.6 9.4 79.9 3162 347 28.7 
1968 35.9 9.4 81.9 3071 340 28.7 
1969 37.7 7.7 81.6 3000 304 25.2 
1970 39.5 7.8 84.8 2949 304 24.7 
1971 41.2 7.9 89.5 2902 304 24.3 
1972 43.7 7.9 93.2 2860 303 23.8 
1973 44.7 7.7 101.9 2823 300 24.4 
1974 45.0 7.8 104.9 2795 301 24.6 
1975 48.3 9.2 109.6 2521 293 24.8 
1976 51.1 9.6 115.2 2497 298 24.2 
1977 52.1 9.8 117.8 2456 296 24.1 
1978 55.8 10.3 124.7 2436 302 23.6 
1979 57.4 9.6 120.7 2432 291 23.7 
1980 59.2 9.8 127.7 2433 296 23.5 
1981 58.8 10.2 136.8 2434 302 23.5 
1982 63.6 11.4 156.5 2401 314 22.5 
1983 60.3 11.5 159.2 2370 311 22.7 
1984 61.0 11.6 159.5 2328 308 22.9 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: National Financial 
Summary 1984. 
a. The mean is total real farm marketings divided by the number of farms. The median and ninetieth percentile 
point of distribution of farm sales, the number of farms with sales between $50,000 and $150,000 (in 1984 dollars), 
and the fraction of gross income generated by farms with sales between $50,000 and $150,000 were estimated 
assuming that sales per farm is lognormally distributed. All deflation was done using the farm price index from the 
Economic Report of the President, February 1986. 
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farming operations, Bruce Hall and Phillip Le Veen find that most of the 
studies suggest that the long-run average-cost curve is "L-shaped," so 
that most of the benefits of technology are achieved by modestly sized 
farms of from 100 to 320 acres, depending on the crop.27 The studies 
suggest that very large farms have relatively small technological advan- 
tages over farms of moderate size. Several other authors have argued 
that the realization of managerial economies and economies of scope 
require moderate farm size.28 
The second explanation for the increase in farm size is that farmers 
have different access to credit, depending on cash-flow histories and 
collateral, and that the farms of the ";creditworthy expand dispropor- 
tionately." Though Hall and Le Veen note that financial factors could 
lead to an increase in farm size, they do not present any empirical 
evidence on this point. Indirect evidence of the importance of access to 
credit for farm investment comes from the work of Linda Lee, who finds 
that large farms or farms with significant uncommitted cash flows were 
more active than others in soil-conservation practices.29 Credit con- 
straints, in other words, may lead farmers to reduce long-run investments 
that would otherwise maintain the quantity or quality of the topsoil and 
land.30 One would expect credit supply effects to be especially pro- 
nounced for long-term investments such as soil conservation, since 
short-run credit supply restrictions increase the effective discount rates 
of constrained borrowers. 
27. Bruce F. Hall and E. Phillip Le Veen, "Farm Size and Economic Efficiency: The 
Case of California," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 59 (November 
1978), pp. 589-600. A study of cash grain farms in Illinois makes a similar finding. See 
Philip Garcia, Steven T. Sonka, and Man Sik Yoo, "Farm Size, Tenure, and Economic 
Efficiency in a Sample of Illinois Grain Farms," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, vol. 64 (February 1982), pp. 119-23. See also the earlier discussion in Kenneth 
R. Krause and Leonard R. Kyle, "Economic Factors Underlying the Incidence of Large 
Farming Units: The Current Situation and Probable Trends," American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, vol. 52 (December 1970), pp. 748-63. 
28. See, for example, the essays in Wes Jackson, Wendell Berry, and Bruce Coleman, 
eds., Meeting the Expectations of the Land: Essays in Sustainable Agriculture and 
Stewardship (North Point Press, 1984). 
29. Linda K. Lee, "The Impact of Landownership Factors on Soil Conservation," 
American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, vol. 62 (December 1980), pp. 1070-76. 
30. A good discussion of the costs of poor soil conservation practices can be found in 
David Pimentel and others, "Land Degradation: Effects on Food and Energy Resources," 
Science, vol. 194 (October 8, 1976), pp. 149-55. In the 1930s, poor soil conservation 
practices were thought by life insurance company lending agents to accompany credit 
constraints for farmers; see the discussion in Archibald M. Woodruff, Jr., Farm Mortgage 
Loans of Life Insurance Companies (Yale University Press, 1937). 
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Trying to model links between farm agglomeration and such credit 
variables as collateral, debt service ratios, or debt-equity ratios is 
problematic because of the multiplicity of potential relationships. In- 
creased debt service and debt-equity ratios can lead to larger farms in 
various ways, and they can also lead to smaller farms. A farmer who 
expects either increased product demand or increased productivity will 
be tempted to expand his operation. Thus increased DS and DIE would 
be associated with increased expansion of output and of farm sizes, an 
explanation consistent with the expansion of output and debt in the 
1970s. But as debt service and debt-equity ratios increase, more farmers 
are exposed to the risk of failure. If the failed farms are sold to already 
large and expanding enterprises, the effect of farm failures will be to 
increase average farm size. If they are subdivided and sold as smaller 
farms, average farm size will decrease. 
While increasing average farm size may reflect the increasing produc- 
tivity of all existing farmers, a widening of differences in farm size 
indicates differences in individual farmers' abilities or desires to make 
their farms grow, providing evidence consistent with the importance of 
credit availability. Table 6 shows that average farm size increased 
primarily because the largest farms expanded. The fraction of income of 
moderately sized farms-those with real sales between $50,000 and 
$150,000-fell from 1960 to 1984. Over this period, while mean farm 
sales and the sales of the ninetieth percentile tripled, median farm sales 
grew by only 49 percent. Thus the increase in the average scale of 
production has not been accomplished through proportional increases 
in all farms' output; rather, the variance of farm size has increased 
dramatically along with the mean. 
Public Policy and Institutional Farm Lenders 
Establishing the importance of credit supply restrictions provides a 
starting point for policy analysis. It is important, however, to focus on 
the institutions of agricultural credit markets and how they might be 
used in the implementation of policy reforms. The principal postwar 
institutional farm lenders have been commercial banks, the Farm Credit 
System, the Farmers Home Administration, and life insurance compa- 
nies. As table 7 shows, the importance of life insurance companies has 
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Table 7. Total Outstanding Farm Debt by Lender, 1950-85 
Total 
Holder of debt (percent) 
(billions Life Farm Farmers 
of 1984 insurance Credit Home 
Year dollars)a Banks companies System Administration 
1950 22.4 50.2 18.2 22.8 8.8 
1951 24.2 51.9 18.5 21.5 8.2 
1952 27.1 53.5 18.4 20.9 7.2 
1953 28.2 52.0 19.3 21.0 7.6 
1954 27.5 48.0 21.9 21.6 8.5 
1955 29.0 47.5 22.2 21.6 8.7 
1956 31.8 47.7 22.1 22.1 8.1 
1957 32.6 45.1 22.9 23.7 8.3 
1958 34.9 44.6 21.9 25.1 8.4 
1959 37.9 45.6 20.5 26.1 7.8 
1960 42.0 46.2 19.4 27.0 7.4 
1961 43.8 45.4 19.4 27.8 7.5 
1962 46.7 44.1 19.0 28.2 8.7 
1963 51.2 44.9 18.4 27.9 8.8 
1964 55.9 45.2 18.5 27.7 8.6 
1965 60.5 44.0 19.2 28.1 8.6 
1966 65.4 43.1 19.3 28.8 8.9 
1967 71.2 42.5 18.8 30.0 8.6 
1968 75.3 42.1 18.1 31.2 8.6 
1969 77.1 41.7 17.7 31.9 8.8 
1970 79.1 41.1 16.7 33.5 8.7 
1971 80.8 41.2 15.3 34.9 8.6 
1972 85.2 42.2 13.8 35.8 8.2 
1973 89.2 43.4 12.6 36.1 7.9 
1974 94.1 44.1 11.5 37.1 7.3 
1975 98.3 41.9 10.8 40.3 7.1 
1976 104.8 40.6 10.2 41.6 7.6 
1977 111.6 40.8 9.9 42.1 7.2 
1978 118.9 39.6 10.3 41.9 8.1 
1979 125.0 38.0 10.7 41.5 9.8 
1980 135.0 34.3 10.4 42.0 13.3 
1981 137.6 31.5 10.0 44.0 14.4 
1982 144.1 29.2 9.1 46.2 15.5 
1983 144.9 30.1 8.5 46.1 15.2 
1984 143.1 31.8 8.3 44.9 15.0 
1985 140.0 32.5 8.0 43.7 15.8 
Source: Melichar, Agricultiural Finance Databook. 
a. Debt figures exclude loans made by "individuals and others." 
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diminished steadily since the mid-1960s.3' We review the current status 
and special attributes of the other three lenders below. Each has 
particular characteristics that offer possibilities for federal intervention 
and reform. 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Commercial agricultural banks-banks with greater than the national 
average of 16 percent of their loan portfolio in agriculture-are concen- 
trated in states where banking is restricted by prohibitions on interstate 
entry and, typically, by unit-banking laws. Branch-banking restrictions 
increase the already weakened banks' vulnerability to failure-by re- 
stricting bank size and the ability to diversify loan risks-and accentuate 
the consequences of bank failures by limiting the entry of alternative 
intermediaries.32 The high leverage and low cash flow of many agricul- 
tural borrowers indicate that private bank failures and concomitant 
agricultural bank credit scarcity are unlikely to abate over the next few 
years.33 
The scope for improvement of agricultural banks through branching 
and diversification is demonstrated by the robust performance of Cali- 
fornia banks despite the weakness of the state's large farm economy. 
31. The decline in life insurance companies' participation in agricultural credit markets 
(primarily in real estate mortgages) results in part from the increased involvement of the 
Farm Credit System in farm lending. This decline has intensified in recent years, as might 
be expected from an analysis of lenders' relative efficiency in monitoring information- 
intensive loans in bad times. Life insurance companies also sharply curtailed their lending 
in the 1930s in response to both the deflation in farm prices and the centralization of loan 
administration; see Woodruff, Farm Mortgage Loans. 
32. Sixty-eight agricultural banks failed in 1985, most of them small relative to surviving 
agricultural banks and nonagricultural banks. Failed agricultural banks had average total 
assets of $21 million, which is two-thirds the average for agricultural bank assets and one- 
eighth the average size for all commercial banks. Vulnerable agricultural banks-those 
with past-due and nonperforming loans greater than total capital-rose from 240 at the end 
of 1984 to 332 at the end of 1985. Net charge-offs as a percentage of total loans at agricultural 
banks increased from an average of 0.21 in the 1970s to 0.32 in 1980, 0.69 in 1982, 1.22 in 
1984, and 2.12 in 1985. The rate of return on equity for agricultural banks as a group 
declined from an average of 14 percent in the 1970s to 11 percent in 1983. 9 percent in 1984, 
and 6 percent in 1985. See Emanuel Melichar, "Agricultural Banking Experience, 1985, 
Preliminary Data Appendix" (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 
8, 1986). 
33. See Melichar, "Agricultural Banks," pp. 437-38. Melichar estimates that two- 
fifths of farms' bank debt is in danger of default. 
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California leads the country in total agricultural production and has had 
a higher-than-average percentage of troubled agricultural oans. The 
percentage of agricultural oans with nonaccrual status in 1984 was 8.4 
for California and 4.7 for the rest of the country. The agricultural oan 
delinquency rate for 1984 was 13.1 percent in California, compared with 
the national average of 8.9 percent. Net charge-offs as a percentage of 
agricultural loans were 6.1 percent in California and 1.8 percent in other 
states.34 At the same time, California accounted for only one of the sixty- 
eight agricultural bank failures in 1985. The reason that California's 
banks are weathering the storm is that most agricultural ending in the 
state comes from large banks, which hold only 3 percent of their portfolio 
in agricultural production loans.3 
Further evidence of the scope for improvement through branch 
banking comes from the distribution of troubled banks. In 1985, more 
than one-third of U.S. agricultural banks had a proportion of nonper- 
forming loans of less than 2 percent, compared with the national average 
of 4.5 percent. Just under a third had ratios in excess of 5 percent. 
Similarly, four out of ten agricultural banks showed a rate of return to 
equity of less than 5 percent, while five of ten showed a greater than 10 
percent rate of return.36 Branch banking should lead to a more even 
distribution of losses on agricultural oans among banks and prevent as 
many banks from crossing the failure threshold. In addition, it would 
allow banks with a lower proportion of loan losses to enter markets 
occupied by troubled banks. 
THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
The Cooperative Farm Credit System (FCS) is a nationwide network 
of financial institutions owned by borrower-stockholders and regulated 
by the Farm Credit Administration. It is divided into twelve districts and 
is comprised of twelve Federal Land Banks, twelve Federal Intermediate 
Credit Associations, twelve Banks for Cooperatives, and a central Bank 
for Cooperatives. The Federal Land Banks finance mortgages through 
more than 400 Federal Land Bank Associations; the Federal Interme- 
34. Emanuel Melichar, "Agricultural Banking Experience, 1984" (Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, March 20, 1985), pp. 27, 40. 
35. Melichar, "Agricultural Banks," p. 440. 
36. Ibid., p. 447. 
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diate Credit Associations finance production loans through nearly as 
many Production Credit Associations. 
Until recently the FCS was a loose confederation of decentralized 
organizations with most discretionary authority in the hands of district- 
level management, though funds have been raised by the national-level 
Farm Credit Funding Corporation. One result of the current financial 
stress has been greater centralization in lending policy. The Farm Credit 
Amendments Act of 1985 authorized the existing Farm Credit Adminis- 
tration (FCA) to regulate the districts more closely and from a separate 
arm's-length position. The legislation also authorizes the new Farm 
Credit Capital Corporation to allocate funds among districts in order to 
shore up the relatively weak units with the surplus of the relatively strong 
units. The new Farm Credit Corporation of America is to act as a research 
and advisory arm of the FCS.37 
The troubled condition of the FCS largely parallels that of commercial 
banks; both have roughly the same proportion of debtors in each cash- 
flow-debt-equity class.38 Like commercial banks, FCS intermediaries 
have experienced a growing rate of loan delinquency and threats of 
default. Portfolio quality varies greatly among FCS districts.39 Through 
37. The movement toward centralization corresponds to a commitment from Congress 
to allow the use of public funds to support the FCS, under a complex formula involving 
the participation of the Farm Credit Administration, the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
Congress. Thus at the same time Congress has acted to reassure FCS bondholders (and 
perhaps stockholders) of a government commitment to back FCS bonds, it has created 
legislation to coordinate internal self-help and to centralize decisionmaking in a way that 
makes the system more accountable to Congress. The effect of congressional action on 
bondholder confidence is illustrated by the changes in the yield spread between six-month 
Treasury and FCS securities. The spread rises from roughly zero from January through 
June of 1985 to around 20 basis points in July and August, then rises to a peak of around 
80 basis points for September through November, and falls sharply in December, with the 
passage of the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985. Since then the spread has fallen and 
maintained itself at a level of approximately 20 basis points (through July 1986). 
38. See Agricultural and Credit Outlook, '86 (Farm Credit Administration, January 
1986). 
39. For example, the Springfield, Baltimore, and Texas districts show very low 
percentages of nonaccrual loans (under 2 percent), while the Louisville, St. Louis, St. 
Paul, Omaha, Wichita, and Spokane districts all have nonaccrual loans in excess of 10 
percent. Nonaccrual oans either are over 90 days contractually past due and inadequately 
secured or have been classified as a "loss" or uncollectible with respect to all principal 
and interest due. The districts show greater similarity with respect to the percentage of 
their overall portfolios deemed of "acceptable" quality-that is, loans not classified as 
"loss," "problem," or "vulnerable." Because the percentage of loans not deemed 
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June 1983 all districts reported a ratio of" untroubled" to total loan items 
at Federal Land Banks in excess of 92 percent. By December 1985, six 
districts had fallen below 85 percent. Much of the variation in perform- 
ance reflects relative degrees of diversification in regional economies.40 
For our purposes, the ability of the FCS to function as an effective 
localized provider of agricultural credit is an important consideration, 
particularly when local banks may be vulnerable to fluctuations in farm 
income because of institutional restrictions on their ability to diversify 
risks. The FCS enjoys advantages over commercial banks both through 
an implicit government commitment to its debtholders and through a 
cooperative national network for spreading risk and merging troubled 
associations. At the same time, three specific features of FCS organiza- 
tion and rules-the method of arriving at interest rates on loans, 
cooperative stock ownership by borrowers, and the potential incompat- 
ibility of local and national goals-complicate coordination and portfolio 
management and decrease FCS effectiveness. 
Its loan interest rate policy has encouraged relatively low-risk bor- 
rowers to leave the FCS recently. FCS interest rates, set on an average- 
cost rather than a marginal-cost basis, reflect the average interest cost 
on outstanding bonds, operating expenses, and past loan losses. When 
bond interest rates fall and losses from the past rise-as they did in the 
past two years-average cost exceeds marginal cost. By pricing at 
average cost, therefore, the FCS encourages borrowers who can retire 
debt or refinance it at competing institutions to do so, while at the same 
acceptable is a reasonable predictor of future nonaccrual loans, one would expect the 
currently most troubled districts to continue to experience high relative stress, with the 
addition of the Sacramento district to the list of relatively high future losses. See Annual 
Report of the Cooperative Farm Credit System, various years. 
40. The Springfield and Baltimore districts enjoy a relatively diverse economic base 
that sustains farmland values and offers off-farm employment opportunities during bad 
times for agriculture. Still, it seems not all of the differences among districts' FLB portfolio 
quality in 1985 can be attributed to different incidence of shocks. In 1979, at the end of the 
boom period, the seven districts with below-average ratios of performing unmatured 
principal-to-total loan items were Louisville, St. Louis, Omaha, Wichita, Texas, Sacra- 
mento, and Spokane. With the exception of Texas and Sacramento, these districts also 
showbelow-average portfolio quality in 1985. Though such comparisons are not conclusive, 
they suggest that relatively liberal loan qualification standards may have played a part in 
the adverse recent experiences of some Land Banks. SeeAnnualReport ofthe Cooperative 
Farm Credit System, various years. 
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time it places unwarranted stress on borrowers who remain in the 
system.41 
The cooperative nature of the FCS creates a further incentive for 
borrowers who can withdraw to do so. Upon taking out an FCS loan, 
borrowers must purchase FCS stock amounting to between 5 and 10 
percent of the funds borrowed. When the loan is repaid, the purchase 
price-or a lesser amount if loan losses have reduced shareholders' 
equity to below par value-is reimbursed to borrowers; it is not possible 
to enjoy a capital gain on FCS stock. The threat of future equity losses 
leads borrowers in vulnerable districts to repay their loans prematurely 
in order to withdraw capital before expected portfolio losses are realized; 
it also encourages borrowers in relatively financially healthy districts to 
repay their loans before the impending consolidation of FCS stock by 
the new Farm Credit Capital Corporation eliminates the distinctions 
among districts' equity positions. The combined effect of high interest 
rates and expected capital losses on early "pay-downs" has been large.42 
Because the borrowers leaving the FCS are likely to be among those of 
the highest quality, average-cost pricing and cooperative ownership are 
both further weakening the FCS portfolio. 
Finally, conflicts between national- and district-level objectives have 
created problems for the FCS, both in the past and during the current 
period of transition toward centralization. Policies that are advantageous 
from a national perspective-loan interest rates that vary according to 
risk, for example-may be resisted in troubled districts, where managers 
prefer to keep borrowers' interest rates lower than true marginal cost 
and lack a strong incentive to protect the system's capital since they will 
be net recipients of a capital transfer in any case. At the same time, 
districts with relatively healthy balance sheets may be encouraged to 
41. Average-cost pricing has created a widening interest rate differential between FCS 
intermediaries and their marginal-cost-pricing competitors. For example, in June 1986, 
interest rates on flexible-rate Federal Land Bank mortgages ranged from 11.5 to 12.5 
percent, while insurance companies and commercial banks typically were charging rates 
on mortgages in the range of 10 to 10.5 percent-adjusting for mortgage fee differentials 
(see the Crittenden-Ag Financing Newsletter, various issues, 1986). 
42. Estimated pay-downs for the first five months of 1986 for all twelve districts totaled 
$1.6 billion-roughly 2.7 percent of total FCS loans. District surveys indicate that the 
primary reason given for these pay-downs was high interest rates; the majority of borrowers 
who withdrew from the FCS switched to competing institutions. Loan pay-down data 
were provided by Robert Jensen of the Farm Credit Corporation of America. 
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lend more freely, before the new Capital Corporation has a chance to 
implement its program of interdistrict capital transfers. 
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION 
The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), the "lender of last 
resort" for farmers, provides direct loans of various types, including 
Farm Ownership Loans, Farm Operating Loans, Economic Emergency 
Loans, and Economic Disaster Loans, as well as loan guarantees on 
loans made by other lending institutions. Applicants for credit must own 
or operate a "family-sized" farm, not so big that it requires a large 
proportion of hired labor, nor so small as to be considered a "rural 
residence." Further requirements are that the applicant have been 
refused credit from another lending institution; have experience as a 
farmer; be " creditworthy" (recent bankruptcy, delinquency, orahistory 
of slow payments would be evidence to the contrary); and demonstrate 
a reliance on farm income.43 
Credit supply restrictions to troubled borrowers in local loan markets 
need not be binding if government credit sources are sufficiently gener- 
ous. Funding limits for the various FmHA programs are set by Congress, 
although until recently these limits did not really constrain FmHA 
lending. Typically, in the past, when one program's funding limits were 
reached, Congress increased funding or the Secretary of Agriculture 
transferred funds from another program. Since some loan programs, 
such as the Economic Disaster Program (ED), had unlimited "entitle- 
ment" status, the power to transfer funds from one to another effectively 
gave the Secretary of Agriculture an unlimited amount of lending 
authority. For example, in fiscal year 1985, the secretary transferred 
$1.7 billion from the ED program to the direct Farm Operating Loan 
(OL) program and $460 million from the ED program to the guaranteed 
OL program. 
Two recent developments have made congressional lending limits 
binding. First, the volume of FmHA loan requests has risen markedly 
43. The farmer's credentials-including a "Farm and Home Plan" -are examined by 
local county supervisors whose decisions are approved on a pro forma basis by county 
committees. The Farm and Home Plan contains information on current debts and assets, 
as well as historical and projected cash flow. Loan qualification standards are the same for 
direct as for guaranteed loans. 
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since 1984, as borrowers who previously depended on the FCS and 
commercial banks find themselves unable to secure credit without FmHA 
assistance-in the form either of a direct loan or of a loan guarantee. 
Total FmHA loans increased nearly 10 percent during fiscal 1985 to a 
level of over $29 billion. Second, the entitlement-loan-program loophole 
was eliminated by the Food Security Act of 1985, which placed a ceiling 
of $1.3 billion on the ED program. 
In recent years, the portfolio of the FmHA has suffered more than 
that of any other major lending institution. By June 30, 1985, roughly 50 
percent of FmHA loan principal was in delinquent loans, of which a 
majority have been delinquent for more than three years. As of December 
1984, 40 percent of the FmHA borrowers had debt-equity ratios of 
greater than 70 percent and negative cash flow-twice the figure for 
commercial banks and the FCS and, presumably, a reflection of the 
poorer initial quality of FmHA borrowers." Another explanation for 
such a high proportion of loan delinquencies is the court-enforced 
moratorium on many FmHA foreclosures from 1983 through 1985, when 
the FmHA was forced to adopt uniform, detailed standards for informing 
borrowers of their rights and options, which include applying for re- 
scheduling or for a five-year payment deferral. 
Loan standards are tightening at the FmHA: rescheduling or deferral 
is permitted only in cases where the farmer can demonstrate long-run 
viability. By the end of fiscal 1985, the FmHA had received 108,710 
applications for assistance by borrowers; 29,196 of these were granted a 
rescheduling, 15,794 were granted a debt set-aside, and 21,539 were 
rejected for reasons of inadequate cash flow.45 More than half of the 
65,000 adverse action notices sent out by the FmHA so far this year will 
probably end in foreclosure.46 
A further tightening of FmHA credit also seems imminent. As 
mentioned, congressionally imposed limits are now in force, as are 
tighter eligibility requirements for operating loans adopted in November 
1985. In the past, the FmHA paid little attention to an applicant's ability 
to service other loans; now, a farmer who cannot pay off other debts in 
addition to the operating loan cannot be granted credit. This change, 
combined with the simultaneous increase in foreclosures, will force 
44. Memorandum, Farm Credit Corporation of America, July 11, 1986. 
45. Agricultural and Credit Outlook, '86, p. 40. 
46. Estimate made by Jerry Hansen of the Center for Rural Affairs. 
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many farmers who once qualified for FmHA forbearance to leave 
farming. 
New Directions for Farm Policy 
Radical changes in the structure of domestic and international agri- 
culture since the major federal farm programs were established in the 
1930s require that decisionmakers rethink the whole thrust of farm 
policy. Traditional price supports, acreage-reduction programs, and 
other government transfers, such as export subsidies, cannot alleviate 
distress in the farm sector at a reasonable cost. By contrast, federal 
intervention through credit markets will smooth the transition to a more 
market-oriented agricultural sector. Targeted income maintenance may 
be required to save particular groups of farms-such as the "family 
farm"-deemed socially valuable. 
Our recommendations for reforms in agricultural credit markets center 
on our finding of the importance of "local" relationships between 
individual borrowers and financial intermediaries, arising from borrow- 
ers' lack of access to national credit markets, compounded by restrictions 
on the ability of certain lenders to diversify risks. The principal recom- 
mendations are two. 
MAINTAIN THE LONG-RUN HEALTH OF LOCAL LENDERS 
The government should focus its assistance on maintaining relatively 
efficient farm producers and financial intermediaries whose exis- 
tence is threatened by the current crisis. As important repositories of 
scarce information capital, the FCS and private commercial banks serve 
as a conduit to those farmers who would be likely to meet the long-run 
discipline of the market but may fail because of short-run debt service 
constraints or unsupportable debt leveraging under current land values. 
Government assistance programs that recapitalize financial intermedi- 
aries and allow them to select optimally among potential recipients are 
superior to necessarily dispersed government-administered programs 
for debtors that rely on vague rules of thumb. 
In addition, the fact that many shocks experienced in the farm sector 
are crop- or region-specific indicates the importance of promoting di- 
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versification of the loan portfolios of agricultural lenders.47 Potential 
strategies include removing branching restrictions that limit the ability 
of local banks to pool risks; centralizing accounts of the Farm Credit 
System, which can borrow in national markets and pool risks across 
districts; and encouraging loan pricing based on marginal cost in the 
FCS so that borrowers' costs reflect forward-looking individual risk 
rather than past aggregate average cost.48 
EMPHASIZE LONG-RUN EFFICIENCY 
In an environment with substantial " openness" in farming and with 
extensive international competition, available funds should be distrib- 
uted to maximize efficient farm production in the long run. A partial debt 
bailout or income-support program evenly dispersed among all farmers 
or among those who face the prospect of failure is unlikely to work. 
Depending on how one defines "vulnerable" debt, the proportion of 
vulnerable to total debt varies between one-third and one-half.49 Focus- 
ing scarce government assistance on relatively efficient producers by 
channeling aid through financial intermediaries would thus be a more 
effective, as well as efficient, means of aiding distressed farmers than 
price or income supports. 
We have little to say about the issue of "saving the family farm." 
Indeed, the dramatic changes in productivity and in the structure of 
agricultural markets have complicated any operational definition of 
"family farms." Still, effective policies will be those targeted toward 
well-defined groups (as with the credit reforms suggested above). Given 
this targeting, it is likely that income-maintenance programs will be 
needed to keep in business some groups of farms felt to be socially 
desirable. The temptation to alter farm prices to achieve these political 
47. Encouraging horizontal (crop) diversification for individual farmers would also be 
helpful, but the ability to diversify meaningfully is region-specific. 
48. The elimination of branching restrictions is, of course, a good idea for other reasons 
having little to do with agriculture. We emphasize the idea here for three reasons. First, it 
illustrates well our point that localized lenders may experience difficulties in servicing the 
credit needs of agricultural borrowers. Second, it points up the value of the operations of 
the Farm Credit System in a loan market with branch-banking restrictions. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that, while farm interests have historically supported the idea of small 
banks with no branching, such a system may no longer be in their best interest. 
49. See Melichar, "Agricultural Banks," p. 444; and Agricultural and Credit Outlook, 
'86, pp. 27-9. 
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goals should be avoided in the interest of both economic efficiency and 
budgetary cost. 
Conclusions 
As international trade in farm products has expanded, so has the 
sensitivity of farm incomes to fluctuations in domestic and world 
economic conditions. Thus, while the price-stabilization, acreage- 
reduction, and related policies in place since the 1930s were relatively 
successful in stabilizing farm income during the 1950s and 1960s, they 
are likely to be less effective in achieving this goal in the future. 
Analysis of the state panel data indicates that disruptions in agricul- 
tural credit markets can have real effects on farm output. That finding is 
consistent with the conventional wisdom that, unlike credit markets for 
large firms or for firms for which monitoring is less costly, agricultural 
financial markets require close customer arrangements. Local financial 
institutions, for which such relationships are best developed, are often 
unable, for institutional reasons, to diversify their loan risks, either 
within agriculture or across other geographically separated activities. 
The deviations from perfect markets indicate an economic rationale-in 
addition to the usual political, social, and national defense rationales- 
for government intervention in agricultural credit markets. Our empirical 
evidence supports the view that attempting to maintain customer rela- 
tionships should be an important objective of the FDIC when handling 
failed or failing farm banks. Because of the Farm Credit System's ability 
to pool agricultural oan risks nationally and because of its access to 
national capital markets, the FCS will continue to be an important lender 
in agricultural credit markets. 
APPENDIX 
State Panel Data 
THIS APPENDIX provides definitions and sources for the state panel data 
base covering twenty-four states from 1977 through 1984. 
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Q = Cash receipts from farm marketings/P 
DS = INT/INC 
DIE = Debt/Equity, 
where: 
Cash receipts from farm marketings is from U.S. Department of Agri- 
culture, Economic Research Service, Economic Indicators of the 
Farm Sector: State Income and Balance Sheet Statistics 1984 (GPO, 
1986), table 4. 
P = a price index constructed by weighting an annual series of national 
commodity prices by the quantity of output produced in 1980 for the 
five agricultural products of each state with the greatest sales in 1980. 
The annual price data from 1977 through 1984 are from U.S. Depart- 
ment of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics (GPO, 1985). The cash 
receipts for the top five products in each state in 1980 were taken from 
Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: State Income and Balance 
Sheet Statistics 1980, table 2. The products used to construct this 
index were cattle, dairy, soybeans, corn, wheat, hogs, broilers, 
cotton, eggs, tobacco, hay, rice, turkeys, grapes, potatoes, oranges, 
sorghum, apples, forestry, to matoes, green peas, sugar beets, barley, 
dry beans, and peanuts. "Nursery and greenhouse products" were 
excluded because of ambiguities associated with the price for these 
products. 
RE = the average real value (deflated by the GNP deflator) of farmland 
in the state, as of January 1, obtained from U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Farm Real Estate Market Developments: Outlook and 
Situation Report (GPO, 1984). 
FAILS = the number of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation board 
actions (liquidations and forced acquisitions and mergers) pertaining 
to commercial banks in each state in each year, collected from Annual 
Reports of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1977-1984. 
Loan Charge-offs = net loan charge-offs as a percentage of total loans 
at agricultural banks in each state in each year, from Emanuel 
Melichar, "Agricultural Banking Experience, 1985" (Preliminary 
Data Appendix, Board of Governers of the Federal Reserve System, 
March 8, 1986), table E.7. 
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INT = total interest payments on debt, collected from Economic 
Indicators of the Farm Sector: State Income and Balance Sheet 
Statistics 1980, tables 11-12; and 1984, tables 25-30. 
INC = gross income of the state farm sector, from Economic Indicators 
of the Farm Sector: State Income and Balance Sheet Statistics 1980, 
table 4; and 1984, table 5. 
FS = the fraction of total sales in 1982, by state, generated by farms 
with sales per farm falling between $40,000 and $99,000 (1982 dollars), 
collected from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982 Census of 
Agriculture, vol. 1, Geographic Area Series (GPO, 1982), table 3. 
Debt = the estimated market value of total farm debt as of January 1 
from Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: State Income and 
Balance Sheet Statistics 1984, tables T43-T44. 
Equity = the estimated market value of total farm equity as of January 
1 from Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: State Income and 
Balance Sheet Statistics 1984, table B2. 
